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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 In the underlying bankruptcy action, Neil Ettinger and 
Ettinger and Associates, LLC (jointly and severally, 
“Ettinger”) filed an adversary complaint objecting to the 
discharge of legal fees owed by Tammy and Gregory Miller 
(the “Millers”), Ettinger’s former clients and the debtors in 
bankruptcy.  The Bankruptcy Court threw out the complaint, 
which asserted that the Millers’ outstanding debt was 
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nondischargeable because it was obtained via fraud, and 
imposed a $20,000 sanction against Ettinger jointly with his 
bankruptcy counsel, Demetrios Tsarouhis.  The District Court 
vacated this ruling on the ground that the sanctions order 
violated the procedural “safe harbor” requirements of Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 9011, but it refused to remand the case for further 
consideration under Rule 9011 “[b]ecause it is too late to cure 
the safe harbor violation.” Dist. Ct. Mem. Order at 22 (June 
28, 2012).  Moreover, because “the Bankruptcy Court based 
its decision to sanction on Rule 9011,” the District Court 
would “not opine in the first instance on whether sanctions 
grounded in some other authority would have been 
appropriate.”  Id.  Yet it also refused to remand to the 
Bankruptcy Court for that consideration.  We agree with the 
District Court’s legal conclusion on Rule 9011, but remand 
the case with instruction to permit the Bankruptcy Court to 
consider alternative avenues to impose sanctions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The Millers retained Ettinger in January 2008 to 
represent them in a landlord/tenant dispute.  Over a 23-month 
period, Ettinger ran up a bill of approximately $43,000, 
although the dispute was ultimately settled for $9,500.  
During the course of this litigation, the Millers paid Ettinger 
approximately $20,000 in legal fees.  Even before the 
landlord-tenant matter had been resolved, however, Ettinger 
sought relief in Pennsylvania state court in an attempt to 
accelerate the speed at which he was being paid the 
outstanding amount owed—close to $23,000.  He twice 
petitioned the court to withdraw as a counsel, first based on 
the Millers’ alleged failure to pay (in October 2009), and then 
due to their professed “lack of cooperation” in the underlying 
dispute (in December 2009). 
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 Both petitions were rejected, though the Millers were 
ordered to make “good faith” payments in exchange for 
continued representation.1
 A. Bankruptcy Court Proceedings 
  Despite their continued payments, 
Ettinger sued the Millers in March 2010, asserting claims for 
breach of contract and quantum meruit.  The Millers filed for 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection the following month, giving 
rise to these proceedings. 
 After the Millers filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
Ettinger—acting through Tsarouhis—filed an adversary 
proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court in August 2010 in an 
attempt to prevent the discharge of the Millers’ remaining 
legal debt to him.2
                                              
1 The Millers faced mounting financial difficulties during the 
pendency of the landlord/tenant dispute, attributable in part to 
their legal debt and exacerbated by personal circumstances 
(e.g., both were out of work due to medical conditions).  
Nonetheless, they complied with the court order and made 
regular payments to Ettinger of $100 to $200 per month. 
  In his adversary complaint, Ettinger raised 
2 Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(a), “any creditor may file a 
complaint to obtain a determination of the dischargeability of 
any debt.”  Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code lists various 
types of debt that may be exempted from discharge, one of 
which is for “services . . . to the extent obtained by . . . false 
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(A).  Every objection to the discharge of a debt 
alleged to have been obtained by false pretenses or fraud must 
be brought as an “adversary proceeding,” see Fed. R. Bankr. 
P. 7001(4), which litigation closely resembles a civil 
proceeding before a federal district court judge.  These 
proceedings are governed by Part VII of the Federal Rules of 
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allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, though in previous 
proceedings he had characterized the Millers’ alleged failure 
to pay as a purely contractual claim.  The Bankruptcy Court 
held a trial on the adversary complaint in April 2011, 
immediately after which it found in favor of the Millers on 
the dischargeability of their debt.  As outlined below, whether 
(and when) Ettinger and Tsarouhis may have engaged in 
sanctionable behavior during the litigation of the adversary 
complaint was a recurring issue throughout the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
  1. Initial Motion for Sanctions 
 On January 31, 2011, the Millers filed and served on 
Ettinger and Tsarouhis a Rule 9011 Motion for Sanctions 
(“Initial Motion”).  It asserted that Ettinger’s complaint was 
“filed to harass and cause [them] to incur additional fees and 
further delay” and “for absolutely no reason other than . . . to 
retaliate against [them].”  Millers’ Mot. for Rule 9011 
Sanctions ¶ 13, Jan. 31, 2011.  The following day, February 1, 
2011, the Millers withdrew the Initial Motion without 
explanation and served a copy of their withdrawal request on 
Ettinger and Tsarouhis. 
 On February 23, 2011, the Millers re-filed and re-
served a motion substantively the same as their Initial 
Motion.  The Bankruptcy Court ruled shortly thereafter that 
“the 9011 Motion is premature, shall be held in abeyance, and 
shall not be heard until after the merits of this adversary 
proceeding have been determined.”  Scheduling Order at 2, 
Feb. 25, 2011. 
                                                                                                     
Bankruptcy Procedure, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(e), as 
supplemented by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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  2. Litigation of Adversary Complaint 
 Although not asserted in his complaint, Ettinger 
apparently believed that, at some time during his 
representation of the Millers, a bankruptcy attorney advised 
them they could avoid paying Ettinger’s bill by filing for 
bankruptcy.  During discovery, the Millers admitted that they 
had met previously with Pennsylvania bankruptcy attorney 
James Kutkowski; however, they indicated that they had 
consulted him regarding refinancing rather than bankruptcy. 
 Kutkowski was deposed on March 18, 2011.  In his 
deposition, Kutkowski first indicated that he “might” have 
discussed bankruptcy at a meeting with Gregory Miller but 
that he “really truthfully [did not] remember.”  In response to 
a follow-up question, Kutkowski testified that he was “fairly 
confident that [he] did discuss briefly the option of 
bankruptcy.”  Kutkowski also testified at the trial on 
Ettinger’s adversary complaint, held on April 19, 2011, at 
which he indicated he did not remember whether he had 
discussed bankruptcy at his meeting with Mr. Miller, but that 
“it [was] reasonable that it may have come up.”   
At the conclusion of the April 19 trial, the Bankruptcy 
Court issued a bench ruling in favor of the Millers, 
categorically rejecting Ettinger’s claim that the Millers’ 
prepetition debt for legal fees was nondischargeable.  It 
recounted the twelve reasons asserted by Ettinger for 
nondischargeability, “none of which were accurate or correct 
and some of which were offensive.”  Following the issuance 
of its dischargeability ruling, the Court told the Millers to file 
a revised 9011 Motion. 
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  3. Amended Rule 9011 Motion 
 In accord with the Bankruptcy Court’s order, the 
Millers filed and served an amended motion for sanctions 
against Ettinger and Tsarouhis.3
 The Bankruptcy Court granted the Amended Motion.  
Rejecting Ettinger and Tsarouhis’ procedural argument that 
Rule 9011’s safe harbor was violated, the Court found that the 
21-day notice requirement was satisfied by the first filing (on 
January 31) and re-filing (on February 23) of the Millers’ 
Initial Motion, during which period Ettinger and Tsarouhis 
could have taken—yet elected not to take—corrective action 
with respect to their sanctionable conduct.   
  They responded by arguing 
in part that the Millers’ Amended Motion did not comply 
with Rule 9011’s “safe harbor” provision.  That provision 
requires 21 days between serving and filing a sanctions 
motion, during which period the challenged conduct may be 
remedied. 
 On the merits, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that all 
actions taken by Ettinger and Tsarouhis after Kutkowski’s 
March 18 deposition were sanctionable.  That deposition 
testimony, the Court concluded, established that the Millers 
had not attempted to discharge fraudulently their legal fees by 
filing for bankruptcy protection.  It described Kutkowski’s 
deposition as the “linchpin” on which its decision turned.  
Because this left the complaint without factual support, the 
Court found that the continued prosecution by Ettinger and 
Tsarouhis warranted sanctions.  Subsequently, it ordered them 
to pay an aggregate sanction of $20,000.  That sum was to be 
                                              
3 The Millers filed a second amended motion days later, 
which was essentially identical to the first.  We refer to these 
motions jointly as an “Amended Motion.” 
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held in escrow pending approval of the Millers’ attorneys’ 
fees application, then be distributed between the Millers and 
their counsel in accord with a stipulated agreement submitted 
to and approved by the Court.   
 B. District Court Decision 
 The parties filed cross-appeals, and in June 2012 the 
District Court reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s sanction 
decision on procedural grounds.  The District Court 
concluded that the sanction could not stand because the 
Millers had failed to comply with the notice requirements of 
Rule 9011.  Specifically, it found that the Millers’ withdrawal 
and re-filing of their Initial Motion did not provide Ettinger 
and Tsarouhis with fair notice of the conduct claimed to 
violate Rule 9011, and that, even if this motion had triggered 
the safe harbor period, the Millers failed to wait the required 
number of days after service before re-filing (because service 
by mail added three days to the period).  It also criticized the 
Bankruptcy Court’s reliance on conduct that was raised for 
the first time in the Amended Motion, which was filed after 
trial and thus too late for Ettinger and Tsarouhis to cure the 
offensive conduct. 
 Because curing the safe harbor violation was no longer 
possible (i.e., it was impossible to provide Ettinger and 
Tsarouhis 21 days during which they might correct the 
sanctionable conduct), the District Court refused to remand 
the issue to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings.  
While it noted there were several other mechanisms by which 
the Bankruptcy Court could have sanctioned Ettinger and 
Tsarouhis, the District Court refused to consider the 
appropriateness of sanctions under any of those alternative 
options in light of the Bankruptcy Court’s sole reliance on 
Rule 9011.  Apparently for that reason, a remand to consider 
those options was refused.   
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II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over the initial 
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1334.  The District Court 
exercised jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s ruling under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. 
 “We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision and 
exercise the same standard of review as the District Court in 
reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s determinations.”  Schubert 
v. Lucent Techs. Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’ns, Inc.), 554 
F.3d 382, 389 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Fellheimer, Eichen & 
Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Techs., Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1223 
(3d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter “FE&B”]).  “[W]e review a 
bankruptcy court’s ‘legal determinations de novo, its factual 
findings for clear error, and its exercises of discretion for 
abuse thereof.’”  In re Michael, 699 F.3d 305, 308 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Goody’s Family Clothing Inc., 610 
F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 The imposition or denial of sanctions is subject to 
abuse-of-discretion review.  Teamsters Local Union No. 430 
v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(citing Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 
1987)).  A court considering and imposing sanctions must 
“articulate sufficient reasons for its determination of what is 
the appropriate sanction to apply,” and “provide a sufficient 
basis for reviewing its exercise of discretion.” Stuebben v. 
Gioioso (In re Gioioso), 979 F.2d 956, 961 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
Absent record support for imposing sanctions, remand to the 
bankruptcy court is appropriate.  See, e.g., DeLauro v. Porto 
(In re Porto), 645 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e 
must remand this case to the bankruptcy court so that it can 
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either flesh out its reasons for sanctioning [the party] or 
decide that he is not to be sanctioned.”); see also In re 
Gioioso, 979 F.2d at 961 (citing cases). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 On appeal, the Millers challenge the District Court’s 
procedural dismissal on the ground that they “substantially 
complied” with Rule 9011’s safe harbor requirements.  
Specifically, they argue that the Initial Motion was sufficient 
to put Ettinger and Tsarouhis on notice of the allegedly 
sanctionable conduct, and that the District Court erroneously 
included three additional days, based on service by mail, 
when computing the safe harbor period.  The Millers also 
assert that the District Court erred in concluding they could 
not recover for behavior occurring after filing their Initial 
Motion.  In the alternative, the Millers assert that, even 
assuming Rule 9011’s procedural prerequisites were not met, 
the District Court should have remanded because there are 
other means by which the Bankruptcy Court could properly 
impose sanctions.   
 A. Rule 9011 Overview 
 Rule 9011 requires, inter alia, that attorneys’ 
submissions to the court not be “presented for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation,” that legal 
assertions be “warranted by existing law,” and that “factual 
contentions have evidentiary support.”  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
9011(b).  If any of these requirements is violated, a court has 
the discretion—“after notice and a reasonable opportunity to 
respond”—to impose sanctions, which may be initiated by 
motion or sua sponte by the court.  Id. 9011(c). 
11 
 
 Rule 9011’s safe harbor provides that, if a party is 
moving for sanctions, the “motion for sanctions may not be 
filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days 
after service of the motion (or such other period as the court 
may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, 
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or 
appropriately corrected.”  Id. 9011(c)(1)(A).  Only after this 
21-day “safe harbor” period may the moving party file its 
motion with the court.  Id. 
 “The purpose of the safe harbor is to give parties the 
opportunity to correct their errors, with the practical effect 
being that ‘a party cannot delay serving its Rule [90]11 
motion . . . until conclusion of the case (or judicial rejection 
of the offending contention).’”  In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, 
Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
11 advisory committee’s notes (1993 amendments) 
[hereinafter “Rule 11 Advisory Notes”]).4
The safe harbor provisions were intended to 
“protect litigants from sanctions whenever 
possible in order to mitigate Rule [90]11’s 
chilling effects, formalize procedural due 
process considerations such as notice for the 
protection of the party accused of sanctionable 
behavior, and encourage the withdrawal of 
papers that violate the rule without involving 
the . . . court.” 
  As the Tenth 
Circuit Court explained: 
                                              
4 “Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is the equivalent sanctions rule” to 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,  Landon v. 
Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 833 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992), and “cases 
decided pursuant to [Rule 11 also] apply to Rule 9011,’” In re 
Gioioso, 979 F.2d at 960. 
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Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1337.2 (3d ed. 2004)). 
 B. Compliance with Safe Harbor Requirements 
 As an initial matter, we address the technical 
prerequisites for satisfaction of Rule 9011’s procedural safe 
harbor provision.  The District Court concluded correctly that 
strict compliance with the safe harbor rule is required.  As we 
explained in Schaefer Salt, “[i]f the twenty-one day period is 
not provided, the motion must be denied.”  542 F.3d at 99.5
 We note, as did the District Court, that there is a split 
of authority regarding whether re-filing an initially 
  
Rule 9011 “imposes mandatory obligations upon the party 
seeking sanctions, so that failure to comply with the 
procedural requirements precludes the imposition of the 
requested sanctions.”  Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet 
Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
                                              
5 The Millers argue our more recent decisions indicate that 
“substantial compliance” with the safe harbor is sufficient, 
citing In re Mondelli, 508 F. App’x 131 (3d Cir. 2012).  Not 
only is this a not precedential opinion on which reliance for 
legal rulings is unavailing, Mondelli is distinguishable, as it 
involved not the period of the safe harbor but rather the form 
of notice—i.e., a “notification letter” sent in lieu of formal 
service of the Rule 9011 motion.  Id. at 135.  Moreover, 
several courts of appeals have disagreed with the proposition 
that such notification letters may satisfy the safe harbor’s 
procedural requirements.  See, e.g., Roth, 466 F.3d at 1192; 
Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998); Ridder v. 
City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 296 (6th Cir. 1997). 
13 
 
noncompliant Rule 9011 motion after 21 days provides fair 
notice for such sanctions.  Compare Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 
F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2003) (suggesting re-filing may cure 
previous safe harbor noncompliance), Jefferson v. Mass. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., No. 3:07-0715, 2008 WL 4724326, at *6 (M.D. 
Tenn. Oct. 24, 2008) (same), and Muhammad v. Louisiana, 
Nos. 99-3742/2694, 2000 WL 1876350, at *2–3 (E.D. La. 
Dec. 21, 2000) (same), with In re New River Dry Dock, Inc., 
461 B.R. 642, 646 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (rejecting reliance 
on premature filing to satisfy safe harbor), and Xiangyuan 
Zhu v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd., No. 04-2539-KHV, 2007 WL 
675646, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 1, 2007) (same).  The District 
Court sided with the courts that have found this type of 
withdrawal-and-refiling fails to satisfy Rule 9011’s safe 
harbor.  We need not resolve this issue, however, because 
even if the Millers’ Initial Motion started the safe harbor 
clock, they nonetheless failed to wait the requisite period 
before re-filing. 
 Here, the Millers filed and served the Initial Motion on 
January 31, 2011, making 21 days from service February 21, 
2011.  However, because February 21 was a federal holiday, 
the safe harbor was extended until the following day 
(February 22), see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a)(1)(C), (a)(6)(A).  
The Millers served their motion for sanctions by mail in 
accord with the Bankruptcy Court’s rules of procedure.  See 
id. 9011(c)(1)(A) (indicating sanctions motions must comply 
with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004’s service requirements); id. 
7004(b) (requiring service by mail).  When computing time 
for service by mail, three additional days are added after the 
prescribed period would otherwise expire.  Id. 9006(f).  
Adding three days extended the safe harbor period to 
February 25, meaning the earliest the Millers could have re-
filed in compliance with Rule 9011’s notice requirements was 
February 26, 2011.  Because they re-filed on February 23—
days before the safe harbor period had expired—their Initial 
14 
 
Motion was procedurally defective, and any sanction based 
thereon was invalid.6
 The Millers argue the additional three days for mail 
service should not be added to the 21-day period because they 
served Ettinger and Tsarouhis electronically as well as by 
mail.  They rely solely on the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania’s local rules, however, and do not cite any 
authority indicating these rules trump the Bankruptcy Court’s 
rules of procedure.  Absent such support, we agree with the 
computation of time made by the District Court (which is 
surely familiar with its local rules) of the safe harbor period. 
 
 C. Sanctioning Post-Motion Conduct 
 The District Court also found another procedural 
problem with the sanctions imposed, this time regarding due 
process notice requirements.  In particular, the Court 
expressed concern because the sanctions were based on facts 
additional to and different from those in the Initial Motion, 
yet the Millers’ Amended Motion, standing alone, 
undisputedly did not comply with the safe harbor provision.  
See Dist. Ct. Mem. Order at 18 (noting “the Bankruptcy Court 
sanctioned Ettinger and Tsarouhis for conduct that had not 
even occurred at the time the Millers filed and served their 
initial Rule 9011 motions, but allowed the Millers to rely on 
these motions to satisfy the safe harbor [notice] 
requirement”).  And by the time the Millers filed their 
Amended Motion, Ettinger and Tsarouhis had already lost at 
trial on their adversary proceeding, and thus lost as well the 
chance to rectify their offending conduct. 
                                              
6 See also Dist. Ct. Mem. Order at 15–17 (finding the Millers’ 
premature re-filing an “additional and independent reason” 
for vacating the sanctions order). 
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 Permitting a court to sanction a party for conduct 
occurring after the service and filing of a Rule 9011 motion is 
contrary to our recognition that “[d]ue process in the 
imposition of Rule 9011 sanctions requires ‘particularized 
notice.’”  In re Taylor, 655 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 
1357 (3d Cir.1990)).  “Particularized notice” sufficient to 
comport with due process is provided where “a party is on 
notice as to the particular factors that he must address if he is 
to avoid sanctions.”  Jones, 899 F.2d at 1357; see also 
Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(identifying three prerequisites of adequate notice as “1) the 
fact that Rule [90]11 sanctions are under consideration, 2) the 
reasons why sanctions are under consideration, and 3) the 
form of sanctions under consideration” (citation omitted)). 
 In addition, the purpose of Rule 9011 would not be 
advanced if a party could be sanctioned without ever having 
the opportunity to correct the offending behavior.  See, e.g., 
Schaefer Salt, 542 F.3d at 99.  Thus, “‘a party cannot delay 
serving its Rule [90]11 motion . . . until conclusion of the 
case (or judicial rejection of the offending contention),’” id. 
(quoting Rule 11 Advisory Committee Notes), as it would 
effectively be too late to withdraw or correct the offending 
act(s).  To conclude otherwise would allow a party seeking 
sanctions to deprive the target of the opportunity to escape 
them by withdrawal or correction, a crucial component of 
Rule 9011. 
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 D. Other Available Sanctioning Tools 
 Aside from Rule 9011, however, there are various 
sources of authority by which bankruptcy courts may impose 
sanctions.  The District Court identified some of these 
sanctioning tools, including “(1) on the Court’s own initiative 
pursuant to Rule 9011(c)(1)(B); (2) using the Court’s inherent 
power to sanction; or (3) under 11 U.S.C. § 105.”  Dist. Ct. 
Mem. Order at 20; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (permitting 
courts to award costs against attorneys who “unreasonably 
and vexatiously” multiply proceedings).  Notwithstanding its 
recognition of other avenues by which sanctions could have 
been imposed in this case—none of which contains a safe 
harbor timing provision, see, e.g., Brickwood Contractors, 
Inc., 369 F.3d at 389 n.2—the District Court refused to decide 
“in the first instance . . . whether sanctions grounded in some 
other authority would have been appropriate.”  Dist. Ct. Mem. 
Order at 22.  It did so apparently because “the Bankruptcy 
Court based its decision to sanction on Rule 9011” solely.  Id. 
 Not taking the next step—to remand for “first 
instance” review—is where the District Court came up short.  
Because the aforementioned grounds for sanctions do not 
require compliance with any safe harbor provision, we 
conclude it erred by refusing to remand to allow the 
Bankruptcy Court to consider imposing sanctions a different 
way.  Sanctions may be upheld, notwithstanding a safe harbor 
violation, if they are “clearly valid” under a different 
sanctioning mechanism.  See Ginsberg v. Evergreen Sec., Ltd. 
(In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd.), 570 F.3d 1257, 1273 (11th Cir. 
2009).  Remand is necessary, however, to satisfy the due 
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process requirements of adequate notice and an opportunity to 
respond before considering these alternate approaches.7
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 We agree with the District Court that the sanctions 
order issued by the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to Rule 
9011(c)(1)(A) was procedurally defective, and therefore must 
be vacated.  The Millers failed to wait the required days 
between serving and filing their Initial Motion, and they 
provided no advance notice with respect to the additional 
claims within their Amended Motion.  Further, Rule 9011 
was an improper provision to penalize conduct that occurred 
well after the Millers initially moved for sanctions against 
Ettinger and Tsarouhis. 
 However, because there are various sanctioning tools 
available that are unaffected by this procedural problem, we 
conclude remand is the proper course to allow the Bankruptcy 
Court to consider those options.  Thus we vacate the District 
Court’s order, and remand the case with instruction to remand 
to the Bankruptcy Court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
                                              
7 While our dissenting colleague believes that remand is 
inappropriate because the Bankruptcy Court considered yet 
chose not to use other sanctioning tools, we find no indication 
in the record that those other avenues were considered 
meaningfully.  And because our reading of the record as a 
whole makes clear that the Court believed sanctions were 
warranted in this case, we conclude remand is the proper 
course. 
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McKEE, Chief Judge, concurring. 
 
 I agree that the sanctions order issued by the 
Bankruptcy Court pursuant to Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) was 
procedurally defective and therefore must be vacated.   I also 
agree that a remand is appropriate to allow the Millers to 
pursue alternative avenues of securing sanctions against 
Ettinger.   In joining Judge Ambro’s opinion, I do not suggest 
that a party should always be afforded the luxury of a “second 
bite of the apple” when failure to adhere to the procedural 
requirements of Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) negates the subsequent 
imposition of sanctions.  However, I believe that a remand is 
required here because of Ettinger’s egregious conduct toward 
these clients.  
 
 The Millers paid Ettinger almost $20,000 towards his 
$43,000 bill and they were continuing to make good faith 
payments to him of $100 to $200 per month pursuant to a 
state court order.  However, the Millers had fallen upon hard 
times and were struggling to keep their heads above water.  
Despite the financial hardship the Millers were facing, and 
despite the monthly payments they were making, Ettinger 
thought it appropriate to file an adversarial complaint against 
his clients in their bankruptcy preceding.  He thus thought it 
appropriate to attempt to ensure that his clients’ debt to him 
would survive the “fresh start” that is the underlying purpose 
of bankruptcy. Not surprisingly, the Bankruptcy Court 
concluded that Ettinger’s conduct required the sanctions that 
the court imposed.  
 
 I see no reason in law or equity to allow such conduct 
to escape sanction merely because of a counting error that 
arose from the fortuitous interposition of a three day 
weekend.  Accordingly, I agree that Ettinger’s conduct 
justifies a remand so that the Bankruptcy court can decide 
whether to adopt an alternative mechanism for imposing 
sanctions.  
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge,  dissenting in part. 
 
 I agree with most of the majority opinion, but come to 
a different conclusion on remanding.  I would not order the 
District Court to send this cause back to the Bankruptcy Court 
and, therefore, dissent in part. 
 
 In ordering the remand, with instructions that the 
bankruptcy judge consider other available sanctions, the 
majority disregards the fact that the judge did consider such 
avenues and rejected them.  Put another way, despite a 
panoply of options available to him, the bankruptcy judge 
chose to limit his choice to Rule 9011.  I would hold him to 
that decision.  Note the record: after citing the “critical 
language” of Rule 9011(c) (limiting sanctions “to what is 
sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable 
conduct by others similarly situated”) the judge explained that 
the sanctions he imposed were not a question of fee shifting 
or repaying the debtors, but instead satisfied his “primary 
goal” of deterring other practitioners from undertaking the 
conduct he found so objectionable in the Appellees.  
Appendix at 160-161.  When asked by Appellant’s counsel 
whether there were any additional sanctions to be had besides 
the $20,000.00 awarded under Rule 9011, the bankruptcy 
judge’s response was clear: “No.  So, it’s $20,000.00.  That’s 
the sanction.  That’s it.”  Appendix at 161.  The bankruptcy 
judge rejected other avenues for sanctions available to him 
and, indeed, his citation to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) in his 
subsequent order evinces knowledge of other vehicles for 
imposing sanctions.  I also note that the Appellants 
themselves failed to explore or request sanctions through 
other means. 
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 Contrary to this, however, my colleagues order the 
remand and come perilously close to expressing a position 
that sanctions should be awarded under different statutes, 
when, to my reading, the bankruptcy judge already rejected 
those avenues.  I can make no other assumption than that my 
colleagues believe some other type of sanctions are required 
here.  That however, is not our call nor is that issue before us.  
I would affirm the District Court in all aspects.   
